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Self-Incrimination And
Congressional Investigations
By E. G. TmImBLE*
TE MRGHT OF A witness before a Congressional Investigating
Committee to refuse to answer questions on the ground of the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment has in recent years
become a matter of great interest and importance because of the
activities of Communists in this country and the efforts of Con-
gressional committees to expose them. This has led to consider-
able confusion as to the powers of Congress and its committees
to make investigations and to compel testimony and also as to the
meaning and purpose of the self-incrimination clause.
The right of a witness to plead this clause of the Amendment
in refusing to answer questions asked by a Congressional commit-
tee was never specifically upheld by the Supreme Court until the
October term of the Court in 1954.
The power of Congress to make investigations and to compel
testimony where self-incrimination was not involved had been
rather clearly established by early decisions of the courts. As
early as 1821 the Supreme Court upheld the power of the House
of Representatives to punish persons outside its membership for
contempt as essential to the effective exertion of other powers ex-
pressly granted.' In 18812 it said that neither House of Congress
had a "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs
of the citizens" but that their power was limited to matters over
which, by the constitution, they had "jurisdiction." In this par-
ticular case the Court upheld the refusal of a witness to testify
because there was no valid legislative purpose to be served. The
* Prof. of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington. A.B., Berea
College; Ph.D., Yale University. Member of Kentucky Bar.
I Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204 (1821).
2 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); see also, Interstate Commerce
v. Brinson, 154 U.S. 407 (1894).
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matter being inquired into-a bankruptcy proceeding of Jay
Cooke & Company, among whose creditors was the U.S.- had be-
come a judicial question. In the case of In re Chapman3 the Court
upheld the authority of the Senate to compel testimony where the
matter investigated related to the integrity and fidelity of the
Senate in the discharge of its duties. This was within "the range
of the constitutional power" of the Senate. Either house could
compel testimony in connection with its "legitimate functions."
In McGrain v. Daugherty4 the Court, after discussing the above
cases, stated its conclusion as to the power of Congressional com-
mittees as follows: "We are of opinion that the power of inquiry-
with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function." It then proceeded to consider the
power of the Senate Committee to compel the witness, M. S.
Daugherty, to testify under a Senate Resolution calling for inquiry
into alleged irregularities of the Department of Justice presided
over by Harry S. Daugherty, a brother of the witness. The Resolu-
tion did not expressly indicate the purpose of the investigation,
but the Court "assumed" a legislative purpose. It said, "the only
legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investiga-
tion was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter
was such that the presumption should be indulged that this was
the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been
better; but... was not indispensable." 5 The witness could there-
fore be made to testify.
These cases clearly establish the principle that the Houses of
Congress can through their committees make investigations and
compel testimony in aid of their legislative or other constitutional
functions. In none of these cases, though, was a refusal to testify
based on the clause of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimi-
nation and they therefore throw no light on the availability of this
defense for refusal to answer questions. In a number of early
cases, however, the Supreme Court has commented on the place
of this principle in our constitutional system.
In 18856 the Court gave some indication as to the significance
of the privilege against self-incrimination when it said that the
3166 U.S. 661 (1897).
4 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
DId. at 178. Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S., 616 (1885).
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compulsory production by a Court order under a Congressional
statute of a man's private papers to be used against him to forfeit
his goods for violating the revenue laws was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment and "that part of the Fifth protecting a man
from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." 7 It is sometimes said today that the Amendment pro-
tects the guilty rather than the innocent, and some have gone so
far as to advocate the elimination or modification of this clause
of the Amendment.' An understanding of its history and purpose
should help to clarify one's thinking on this matter. The Supreme
Court in 1908 described the right of a witness not to be made to
testify against himself "as a privilege of great value, a protection
to the innocent, though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard
against heedless unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions."9 And in
a recent case it said, "This guarantee against testimonial compul-
sion... 'was added to the original constitution in the conviction
that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered en-
forcement of the criminal law and that in its attainment, other
social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed.' This pro-
vision.., must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the
right it was intended to secure."10 But the Court has, however,
recognized a general obligation of a citizen to give testimony. On
this subject it said in another recent case, "persons summoned as
witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties
and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public in-
terest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial ma-
chinery." There were exceptions to this obligation, "But every such
exemption is grounded in a substantial individual interest which
has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the
public interest in the search for truth.""
As to the type of proceedings in which the privilege against
self-incrimination may be used, the Court has said; "The object
was to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting
as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime." 2 In a later
7 Id. at 638. 8 See Note, 44 Ky. L.J. 804, 805 (1956).
9 Twining v. N.I., 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).1o Hoffman v. U.S., 841 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
1U.S. v. Bryan, 889 U.S. 823, 881 (1950).
12 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
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case, it said, "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the
nature of the proceedings in which the testimony is sought or is
used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever
the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him
who gives it."'8 But the privilege is personal and cannot be
pleaded on behalf of anyone else;14 nor is it available to corpora-
tions. 5 The privilege is not available either, to a person when he
has been granted immunity from prosecution by a congressional
statute, 6 and in the absence of such a Federal statute one can
plead the defense only to protect oneself from prosecution in
Federal, not state, courts.'1 Whether or not an answer would in-
criminate the witness is a question for the court to decide in view
of all the facts; and a witness will not be required to answer a
question if the answer would be a link in a chain of incriminating
evidence. 8 The privilege can be waived, 9 however, but in Smith
v. U.S.2 ° the Court said a waiver of "constitutional rights.., is not
lightly to be inferred." In this case the defendant at the outset
of a prosecution for violation of the Second War Powers Act and
the Emergency Price Control Act stated, "I want to claim privi-
lege as to anything I say." The Court upheld his claim of privi-
lege even though after the above statement he voluntarily gave
incriminating testimony in regard to which, when asked if he
claimed privilege, he answered "no." The Court said, "immunity
once claimed is not lost in this case by his saying 'no'."21
In Rogers v. U.S. 2 the Court held that the witness had waived
the privilege. She was subpoenaed by the grand jury to produce
the books and records of the Communist Party in Denver, Colo-
rado. She appeared before the grand jury and admitted having
been the treasurer of the Party in Denver but refused to name
the person to whom she had turned over the books and records.
She justified her refusal on the ground of not wanting to involve
13 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 43 (1924).
14Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
15 Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
16 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
17 U.S. v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); but compare U.S. v. DiCarlo, 102 F.
Supp. 597 (1952).
18 Roger v. U.S., 340 U.S. 367 (1951); but see U.S. v. DiCarlo, supra note 17.
19 Johnson v. U.S., 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
20 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
21 Id. at 150.
22 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
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the individual to whom she had given the books. At a second ap-
pearance before the district judge she claimed the privilege of
self-incrimination for the first time. The lower court held that she
had waived the privilege by having admitted that she was the
treasurer of the Party. The Supreme Court sustained this ruling,
saying that her attempt to use the privilege was an afterthought
and also that, quoting U.S. v. White, she had no such privilege as
to books and papers "'kept in a representative rather than in a
personal capacity ... even though production might tend to in-
criminate [their keeper] personally.' "23
The first recent case in which the Court actually upheld a
witness in refusing to answer questions on grounds of self-incrimi-
nation was Blau v. U.S.24 The witness when called before the
Grand Jury refused to answer questions about the activities of the
Communist Party in Denver and her employment by the Party,
and was convicted in the District Court for contempt. On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed her conviction. The opinion pointed
out that at the time she was called before the jury the Smith Act,
making it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the Government
by force, or to help organize a society which advocated such
doctrine, or to become a member of such a group knowing of its
purpose, was already on the statute books. The Court thought
the witness "reasonably could fear that charges might be brought
against her if she admitted employment by the Communist
Party .... -"25
In 1950, the Court had ruled in a contempt case on a technical
question of whether a quorum of the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee had to be present when the offense of contempt
by a witness was committed. In deciding the case the Court
seemed clearly to assume that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was available before committees of Congress, although it was
not necessary so to decide. 0
During the October 1954 term the Court reversed convictions
in three related cases2 7 of contempt arising out of the inquiries of
23 Id. at 872; U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
24340 U.S. 159 (1950).
25 Id. at 161.
26 U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); it was assumed and the witness was
upheld in lower Court, see U.S. v. Licavoli, 102 F. Supp. 607 (1952).
27 Quinn v. U.S., 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. U.S., 349 U.S. 190 (1955);
Bart v. U.S., 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
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the House Committee on Un-American Activities in which the
privilege against self incrimination was the issue. In each case the
witness was prosecuted for contempt of Congress under Sec. 192
of U.S. Code.28 In the first of these cases, Quinn v. U.S., three
members of a labor union refused to answer questions concerning
their alleged membership in the Communist Party, basing their
refusal on "the First and Fifth Amendments" and "the First
Amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth."
This defense was used by the first witness, Fitzpatrick, and was
adopted by Quinn as justification for his own refusal to answer.
Whether this was a sufficient pleading of the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment was really the question before the
Court. Chief Justice Warren who wrote the opinion began by
reviewing the earlier cases discussed above involving Congress'
power to investigate. He acknowledged the power of Congress
to investigate and to compel testimony to be "co-extensive with
its power to legislate." He pointed out, however, that the power
to investigate was limited. Congress could not pry into "private
affairs unrelated to a valid legislative purpose;" nor did its power
"extend to an area in which Congress is forbidden to legislate;"
the power was "not to be confused with any of the powers of law
enforcement" which were "assigned under our Constitution to
the Executive and Judiciary;" and it was limited by the Bill of
Rights.29 He then cited cases in which the Court had said that
the self-incrimination clause "must be accorded liberal construc-
tion in favor of the right it was intended to secure." "Such liberal
construction," he said, "is particularly warranted in a prosecution
of a witness for a refusal to answer, since the respect normally
accorded the privilege is then buttressed by the presumption of
innocence accorded a defendant in a criminal trial."30 Taking up
the real question as to whether the witness had sufficiently
pleaded the self-incrimination clause, he said that claiming "the
privilege does not require any special combination of words." He
continued, "If an objection was made in any language that a com-
mittee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt
to invoke the privilege, it must be respected, both by the commit-
282 U.S. C See. 192.
29 Quinn v. U.S., supra note 27 at 160.
30 Id. at 162.
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tee and by a Court."'" This, the Chief Justice thought, the witness
had done. He rejected the Government's argument that the wit-
ness had destroyed his defense by pleading both the First and
Fifth Amendments. On this point he said, "if a witness has two
Constitutional objections to a committee's line of questioning he
is not bound at his peril to choose between them." He continued,
"The fact that a witness expresses his intention in vague terms is
immaterial so long as the claim is sufficiently definite to apprise
the Committee of his intention." Quinn's references to the Fifth
Amendment were sufficient to put the Committee on notice of an
apparent claim of the privilege. "It then became incumbent on
the Committee either to accept the claim or to ask petitioner
whether he was in fact invoking the privilege,"32 he concluded.
There was a second ground on which the decision was based.
For conviction of the witness under section 192 of the U.S.
Code for contempt of Congress, a criminal intent had to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Chief Justice said. He then
pointed out that "at no time did the committee specifically over-
rule his objection based on the Fifth Amendment," nor specifically
direct the witness to answer the questions. The witness was never
therefore "confronted with a clear-cut choice between compliance
and non-compliance, between answering the question and risking
prosecution for contempt."33
In the second of the cases, Emspak v. U.S., the basis for the
witness' refusal to answer questions was "primarily the first
Amendment, supplemented by the fifth." This was sufficiently
definite, the Court held, pointing out that a Committee does not
have to accept an ambiguous constitutional claim but can if neces-
sary inquire into the nature of the claim. The Government in this
case had argued that the witness had waived his privilege as to
some particular questions concerning some of his associations.
He was asked, "Is it your feeling that to reveal your knowledge of
them would subject you to criminal prosecution?" His answer
was, "No, I don't think this committee has a right to pry into my
associations. That is my own position." As to whether this con-
stituted a waiver the Chief Justice cited the Smith case to the
effect that a waiver of a Constitutional right was not to be lightly
3, Ibid. 32 Id. at 164. 33 Id. at 166.
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inferred, and said, "we do not think that petitioner's 'no' answer
can be treated as a waiver of his previous express claim under the
Fifth Amendment ... At most it is equivocal," and went on to
say, "that the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental Constitutional rights."34 In this
case also there was no clear-cut over-ruling of the witness' claim
of privilege and no demand that he answer, he concluded.
In the third of these related cases, Bart v. U.S., the Court re-
versed the conviction of petitioner for refusing to answer the
Committee's questions because the necessary criminal intent had
not been shown. The record showed that when the witness re-
fused to answer questions a member of the Committee suggested
to the Chairman that the witness "be advised of the possibilities
of contempt" for refusal to answer. But the Chairman replied,
"No, he has counsel. Counsel knows that is the law." Other dis-
cussion in the Committee revealed that the Chairman advised
counsel for the witness to instruct the witness and not to argue with
the Committee "because we do not rule on objections." The Court
ruled that the "witness was entitled to a clear-cut ruling" at the
time the refusal to answer was made. "Because of the consistent
failure to advise the witness of the committee's position as to his
objections, petitioner was left to speculate about the risk of pos-
sible prosecution for contempt; he was not given a clear choice
between standing on his objections and compliance with a com-
mittee ruling,"35 the Court concluded. The effect of these three
decisions would seem to be that a Congressional Committee must
make it unequivocally clear to a witness that his refusal to answer
questions will be considered contempt and that he will risk prose-
cution.
This review of the court decisions regarding the use of the
plea of self-incrimination in refusing to answer questions before
Congressional committees would seem to justify the following
conclusions. Committees of each House of Congress may be
authorized to investigate any matter over which the House has
express or implied power under the language of the constitution
and such committees can compel witnesses to testify when self-
incrimination is not involved. The power of Congress is limited
34 Easpak v. U.S., supra note 27 at 196.
15 Bart v. U.S., supra note 27 at 223.
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by the absence of any general power to pry into private affairs of
citizens, and presumably by the separation of powers which was
the basic principle in Kilbourn v. Thompson discussed above.
One might suppose that Chief Justice Warren's language that
"the power to investigate must not be confused with any of the
powers of law enforcement," which "are assigned under our con-
stitution to the Executive and the Judiciary"3 was in the nature
of a warning to Congress for the future. Moreover, to plead the
privilege of self-incrimination no particular language is necessary.
Any language that makes reasonably clear what the intention of a
witness is will suffice. If the Committee is in doubt as to the wit-
witness' intentions it can clarify the matter of doubt. It is also in-
cumbent on the committee to make clear to the witness that it re-
jects his claims of privilege and to present him with a clear-cut
choice between answering or refusing to answer and risking prose-
cution for contempt. The Courts will interpret the clause liberally
to protect the privilege.
The court decisions to date throw no light on the legality of
investigations by Committees of Congress for the purpose of "ex-
posing" certain individuals in a private capacity or in public of-
fice or of investigations for the purpose of influencing public
opinion by informing the people of the existence of undesirable
conditions. This fact would seem to indicate the desirability of a
clear statement by Congress in the resolutions creating investi-
gating committees of the constitutional purpose for which the in-
quiry is to be conducted. Presumably the Supreme Court will,
as it did in McGrain v. Daugherty, assume a legislative purpose
where one is not clearly expressed when the subject matter is such
as to make such assumption reasonable. But this decision on that
point was a departure from the position the Court took in the
earlier case of Kilbourn v. Thompson where it said, after review-
ing English precedents as to powers of legislatures to investigate,
that the precedents give little aid to "the doctrine, that this power
exists as one necessary to enable either House of Congress to
exercise successfully their function of legislation."37 For further
clarification of this important field of constitutional law we must
await developments. It may be argued that when Congress is
3
t Quinn v. U.S., supra note 27 at 160.
37 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1881).
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seeking information for the purpose of legislating for the country
as a whole, one called as a witness has greater legal obligation to
testify than if he were testifying as a witness in a criminal case or
before a grand jury. But the issue is the same. It involves re-
conciling the interests of society with that of the individual citizen
and in this matter as in matters involving other provisions of the
Bill of flights it may be that the Supreme Court should, under its
power of judicial review, as it does in connection with Congres-
sional statutes, continue to draw the line between public and pri-
vate rights in committee inquiries. In drawing the line the Court
will no doubt carefully weigh the relative advantages of uphold-
ing Congressional power and defending basic human rights. It
is frequently argued that Congress needs a free use of the investi-
gating power in order to get the facts necessary to legislate wisely.
But it is doubtful if the shortage of facts available to Congress is
so great as to make it necessary or wise to deprive the citizen of
the fundamental privilege of immunity from helping the state to
convict himself. Congress has other means of acquiring informa-
tion. A fundamental principle in Anglo-American jurisprudence
is that the State has the burden of proof without any help from
the accused when a citizen is being prosecuted.
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